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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The sole issue presented in this case is whether the Industrial Commission erred in dismissing Plaintiff's claim based upon
a finding that the employer, a limited partnership, met the agricultural employer coverage exception found in Utah Code Annotated
Section 35-1-42 (2) (b) (1983).
STATEMENTS OF FACTS
This case concerns a Writ of Review which

is being taken

from a denial of a Motion for Review by the Industrial Commission
of Utah which affirmed the Order of an Administrative Law Judge
dated March 22, 1985, wherein it was held that River Ranches, the
uninsured employer, was an agricultural employer pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated §35-1-42 (2) (b) (1983), and, therefore, excempt
from coverage under the Act*

Tr. 265, 274.

On April 17, 1984, Plaintiff, a 45-year-old male, was employed by River Ranches as a sheepherder.

Tr. 36.

On that date,

while performing his normal duties as a sheepherder, Plaintiff
was thrown to the ground by his horse.

Tr. 37.

As a result

thereof, he sustained severe injuries to his right hip and leg.
Tr. 38.
At the time of the hearing on March 18, 1985, the parties
stipulated on the record that River Ranches was the employer and
that it was a limited partnership at the time Plaintiff was injured.

Tr. 28, 29, 36.

In that partnership, Lloyd Johnson,

Gerald Johnson and Burke Johnson are the general partners.
28.

Tr.

The limited partners are Lloyd Johnson's wife and their five

grandsons.

Tr. 30, 264.

On the date of the industrial accident, River Ranches undeniably employed at least four persons

ff

for the relevant period

under consider at ion11 as defined by the Act.

Tr. 264.

Further-

more, Burke Johnson, one of the general partners, testified that
in addition to these four (4) employees, others, namely himself,
Burke Johnson and Gerald Johnson, were also employed during the
relevant time but he was unsure as to whether they worked for the
40 hours or more for a consecutive 13-week period as required by
the statute.

Tr. 71, 72.

Moreover, he testified that another

employee, Carlyle Bird, might also satisfy the work requirement
of the Act.

Tr. 68.

Other

than the uncertain and qualified

testimony of Burke Johnson, these additional four people's work
records were not made a part of the record.
The purpose of the limited partnership is to conduct a livestock

and cropping

limited

partnership

operation.
is

split

Tr. 66.

approximately

livestock and the cropping operation.
At
clined

the conclusion
to

present

any

rebut Plaintiff's case.

Income earned by the

Tr. 74.

between

the

Tr. 66, 264.

of Plaintifffs
testimonial

50/50

case, River Ranches de-

or documentary

evidence

to

Instead, Defendant moved for an

order dismissing Plaintiff's claim.

Tr. 74.

On March 22, 1985, the Administrative Law Judge entered his
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dismissing Plaintiff's claim for benefits because "River Ranches is an agricultural employer" as defined by statute.

Tr. 264-265. Plaintiff's

Motion for Review was denied and the Administrative Law Judges'

order

was

affirmed

by

the

Industrial

Commission

on April 24,

1985, Tr. 274.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff contends that the Industrial Commission erred when
it

affirmed

Plaintiff's

the

Administrative

claim.

Law

Judge's

Specifically, Plaintiff

Order

dismissing

contends

that

the

employer, a limited partnership, failed to produce any evidence
to rebut

the presumption

of coverage

and did not

satisfy

the

rigid exclusionary requirements for Workers1 Compensation coverage for agricultural employers contained in Utah Code Annotated,
§35-1-42

(2) (b) (1983).

Plaintiff

further contends

that the

findings of the Industrial Commission are not supported by any
substantial evidence in the record and, therefore, are arbitrary,
improper, and contrary to law and should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
I
AN EMPLOYER IS PRESUMED TO HAVE
SECURED WORKERS1 COMPENSATION COVERAGE
FOR THE BENEFIT OF ITS EMPLOYEES
The

Utah Workers' Compensation

Act

specifically

that all employers must secure compensation.
ed, Section 35-1-46

provides

Utah Code Annotat-

(1977) provides three ways by which an em-

ployer may satisfy this requirement.

This section also provides

means for the Commission to take affirmative steps against any
employer who fails to provide compensation and force an employer
to comply with the requirements of the Act.

In addition, crim-

inal liability lies against any employer who fails to comply with

-3-

the prescriptions of this section.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-46 (1977) and all other
provisions of the Utah's Workers1 Compensation Act, are in accocd
with the basic features of Workers1 compensation, which have been
succinctly described by Professor Larson as follows:
[It] is a mechanism for providing cashwage benefits and medical care to victims
of work connected injuries, and for placing the cost of the injuries ultimately
on the consumer, through the medium of
insurance, whose premiums are passed on
in the cost of the product.
Larson's
Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. 1, §1,
(1985).
The Utah Supreme Court recently restated the purpose of the
Utah Workers' Compensation Act in State Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 685 P.2d 1051 (1984) where the Court affirmed an award to an employee who sustained injuries in an automobile accident while she was on a special errand for her employer.

The Court stated:
The purpose of the Workers' Compensation
Act is to protect employees who sustained
injuries arising out of their employment
by affording financial security during
the resulting period of disability. Id.
at 1053.

See also State Tax Commission v. Department of Finance, Utah, 576
P.2d

1297 (1978); Buhler v. Gossner, Utah, 530 P.2d 803 (1975);

and Wilstead v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 407 P.2d 692 (1965).
When looking at the stated purpose of Workers' Compensation
and
there

the prescription of Section 35-1-46, it becomes clear that
arises

a presumption

of workers' compensation coverage.

Utah Code Annotated §35-1-42 (2) (b) (1983) specifically provides
that "every person, firm and private corporation" are employers

subject to the provisions of the Act.

Without such a presump-

tion, the generally acknowledged purpose of workers1 compensation
as expressed by this Court would be defeated. Furthermore, the
strict requirements placed upon an employer, and the powers conferred upon the Commission by Section 35-1-46, would be absolutely meaningless and merely an empty expression of legislative hope
were the Act to be construed in any other manner.
Plaintiff

acknowledges

that

the

legislature

has

provided

means whereby this presumption may be rebutted by an employer;
however, it is submitted

in the instant case that the employer

has failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of coverage

applicable here.

Hence, the employer

should

have provided for coverage in accordance with the terms and intent of the law.
II
AN EMPLOYER WHO CLAIMS TO FIT WITHIN
THE PARAMETERS OF THE STATUTORY EXEMPTION
FOR COVERAGE CONTAINED IN THE ACT
HAS THE BURDEN OF PROOF CONCERNING
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE EXEMPTION
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-42 (2) (b) (1983) provides
in material part for an exemption to the general rule of coverage
for certain agricultural employers as follows:

Every person, firm and private corporation
[constitute employers subject to the provision
of this title] except agricultural employers
who employ five or fewer persons other than
immediate family members for 40 hours or more
per week each employee for 13 consecutive
weeks during any part of the preceding
ll
months (emphasis added).
_<;_

This section provides for an exception to the general requirement
that an employer provide workers1 compensation coverage for the
benefit

of his

employees.

Furthermore, this section, if its

applicability is proven by sufficient evidence, provides a means
to rebut

the presumption of coverage.

However, the burden of

proof that the exemption is met rests squarely upon the employer
who is attempting to escape the responsibility for injuries sustained by an employee during the course of his employment.
Another way to view this exception would be to look upon it
as an affirmative defense to a claim for compensation made by an
injured employee.

Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

requires a party to set forth any affirmative defenses when responding to a preceding pleading.
forth

such

proof.

an

affirmative

Moreover, the party which sets

defense

must

bear

the

burden

of

TAtegstaff v. Remco, Inc. , Utah, 540 P.2d 931, 934 (1975).

When applying this allocation of the burden of proof to the
present

case

it becomes apparent that the employer did timely

raise the affirmative defense.

Tr. 16.

However, and most im-

portantly,

to carry

its burden of proof.

the employer

failed

Burke Johnson, one of the employer's general partners, testified
that in addition to the Plaintiff, three other persons (not related to any of the partners) met the requirements of Section 35l-42(2)(b). Tr. 67-68, 265.
that

three other

individuals

In addition, Mr. Johnson testified
also satisfied

the time require-

ments , but he was unsure as to the specifics of their work records.

Tr. 72.

This testimony was given during the Plaintiff's

prima facie case.

The employer further testified that another

employee might also satisfy the time requirement.

Tr., 68. None-

theless, the employer failed to offer any testimony or documentation to rebut any of the testimony given during Plaintiff's case
and failed to conclusively establish that these other persons did
not
Act.

in fact

also work

the minimal period

referred

to in the

Defendant merely presented a large number of exhibits which

supported the testimony given during the Plaintiff's case.
Therefore, it is hereby submitted that Defendant failed to
carry the burden of proving that Section 35-1-42(2)(b) excludes
it from the requirements of the Workers' Compensation Act.
Ill
THE PARTNERSHIP IS A SEPARATE
EMPLOYING LEGAL ENTITY
The Utah State Legislature, by enacting Utah Code Annotated,
Section 48-2-1

(1953, as amended) et_ seq. as part of the Utah

Code, has long recognized the existence of a limited partnership
as a separate entity.
P.2d

Palle v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 7

284, 287-288 (1932).

Professor Larson in his treatise on

Workers' Compensation Law, Section 54.31 (1982) acknowledges and
recognizes the separate entity issue and the obstacles presented
thereby.
The impact of the no-entity problem has been
confined almost entirely to the type of case
in which a partner is the claimant, for it is
in such cases that the almost inseparate conceptual obstacle is encountered of having the
same person appear as employer and employee.
But when this employer-employee merger is not
involved, the courts have usually managed to
get around the entity difficulty. To do this,
it is only necessary to say that the intention
of compensation legislation was to treat the
partnership as an entity in order to effectuate its beneficient purposes. Id.

Applying Professor Larson's reasoning to the present case,
it becomes obvious that the conceptual obstacle of the employeremployee merger does not exist here.
support

the

Ranches,

conclusion

a limited

industrial

injury.

that

The uncontroverted

Plaintiff

partnership, at the
Tr. 18, 265.

was

employed

by

facts
River

time he sustained

his

The testimony given during

Plaintiff's prima facie case also established that Plaintiff was
not a partner in River Ranches.

Tr. 28, 30, 264.

Based upon

these facts, this Court should not have any difficulty in treating River Ranches, a limited partnership, as a separate employing
entity for the purpose of awarding benefits to him.

IV
THE EMPLOYER DID NOT SATISFY
THE EXEMPTION REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED
IN UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 35-1-42 (1983)
Utah

Code Annotated, Section

35-1-42

(2) (1983) provides

that every person, firm and private corporation shall constitute
employers subject to the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act
... except agricultural employers who meet any
one of the following conditions: (a) whose
employees are all members of the immediate
family of the employer, which employer has a
proprietary interest in the farm; provided
that the inclusion of any immediate family
member under the provisions of this title is
at the option of the employer or (b) who employ five or fewer persons other than immediate family members for 40 hours or more per
week per each employee for 13 consecutive
weeks during any part of the preceding 12
months.

When Plaintifffs claim was dismissed by the Administrative
Law Judge, that dismissal was based

upon the finding that the

employer was "an agricultural employer as defined by Section 351-42".

Tr. 265.

Because sub-section (a) requires that all em-

ployees be members

of the immediate family, and River Ranches

employed individuals who were clearly not related to the Johnson
families, the employer claimed that it met sub-section (b) only
and not sub-section (a).

It is hereby submitted, however, that

in any event such a finding is not supported in the record.
First, as a separate entity, River Ranches cannot have an
"immediate family member11.
incapable of procreation.
the everyday meaning

It is a thing, an inanimate entity
It would be an unacceptable stretch of

of the term "immediate

a limited

suggest

that

child.

Though not applicable to this case, Utah Code Annotated,

Section

7-9-3(4)

spouse,

surviving

(1983)

partnership

defines

could

family member" to

that

spouse, children

have

term

...."

a spouse

to mean

or a

"parents,

See also Bogart

v.

Deseret News Publishing Co., Utah, 233 P.2d 355, 357 (1951) where
this Court held that an adult son, who maintained his own household and did not depend on his father for support, was not considered to be an immediate family member of the father.
the Johnson general

and

limited

Therefore,

partners cannot be considered

"immediate family members" such as would exclude them from the
computation of the number of the employees of the employer.
Second, it is undisputed

that River Ranches employed four

persons who unquestionably satisfied the work period contained in
the Act.

Tr. 264.

In addition, Burke Johnson testified that

_Q_

three other persons, and perhaps a fourth person, also satisfied
said

time condition,

Tr. 68-72.

Since none of the testimony

relating to the persons employed was controverted at the time of
the hearing, it is obvious that the Commission's Order was in
error

and must

uncontroverted

be reversed.

The record, therefore, contains

testimony that River Ranches employed seven, and

perhaps eight, persons who satisfied the relevant period of time
under consideration.
And third, the generally recognized rule of law that a partner cannot be classified as an employee of his partnership for
Workers' Compensation

purposes was designed

to apply

in cases

only where there is a merger, i.e., the employer and the injured
employee are the same person.

81 Am Jur.2d, "Workmen's Compensa-

tion", Section 176 (Supp. 1984-1985).
ception to the general rule.

This is, however, an ex-

One such exception involves "work-

ing partners" who receive wages in addition to a share of the
profits, and their wages are included in the payroll.
supra at Section 54.30.

81 Am. Jur.2d, supra.

Larson,

This exception

most clearly applies to the three partners who work for River
Ranches.

Tr. 71 .
V
GIVEN THE LIBERAL INTERPRETATION TO BE AFFORDED
TO THE UTAH WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT, ANY DOUBT
CONCERNING THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S ORDER
MUST BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF

One of the overriding principles which must govern adjudication of Workers' Compensation claims is that such claims are to
be liberally

construed

in favor of awarding benefits, and any

doubts raised must be resolved

in favor of the injured worker.

.in.

Prows v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 610 P.2d

1362, 1363-1364

(1980), citing Chandler

v. Industrial Commission, 55 Utah 213,

184 P. 1020, 1021-1022

(1919),

The Church of Jesus Christ of

Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 590 P.2d 328,
332 (1979) (dissenting opinion).

McPhie v. Industrial Commis-

sion, Utah, 567 P.2d 153, 155 (1977).

Askren v. Industrial Com-

mission, 15 Utah 2d 275, 391 P.2d 302, 304 (1969).

M & K Corpor-

ation v. Industrial Commission, 112 Utah 488, 189 P.2d 132, 134
(1948).

Plaintiff respectfully requests all doubt concerning the

applicability of the Workers1 Compensation Act to River Ranches
be resolved in such a way as to be consistent with the remedial
nature of Workers1 Compensation finding the mandatory coverage of
the Act applicable to it.
CONCLUSION
The Commission

in this case has incorrectly held that the

employer, a limited partnership, has satisfied the conditions of
Utah

Code Annotated,

Section

35-1-42

(2)

(b) (1983) which

in

certain limited cases exempts an agricultural employer from the
requirements of the Workers1 Compensation Act.

This exemption is

contrary to the general purpose of this Act and hence, an employer seeking the benefits of the exemption must come forth with
sufficient evidence to clearly establish the applicability of the
exemption.
cient

River Ranches, however, has failed to present suffi-

evidence

to

support

its

assertion

that

the

exemption

applies in this case.
Nonetheless, the Commission, in dismissing the Plaintiff's
claim, found that all partners of River Ranches are related to

Lloyd Johnson, and further found that River Ranches employed only
four persons other than immediate family members•

Tr . 265, 274.

These findings, however, can only be based on the erroneous conclusion

that

Lloyd

Johnson

was

Plaintiff has demonstrated beyond
was

the employer

the employer

when, in fact,

any doubt that River Ranches

of which Lloyd Johnson was merely

a general

partner .
Plaintiff has also cited the renowned Professor Larson, and
cases of this Court, who has recognized
Workers1

Compensation

a partnership

that

for purposes of

is a separate entity.

In

fact, Professor Larson has reported in his treatise that courts
uniformly hold that a partnership

is a separate entity when a

claimant is not related to any partner.
is accepted,

it becomes

obvious

Once this general rule

that River Ranches can never

satisfy the requirements of Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-42
(2) (b) (1983) for at
having

least two reasons: first, an entity is

"immediate

family

members11;

incapable

of

and

second,

Plaintiff

in his prima facie case introduced testimony that at

least seven, and possibly eight, persons satisfied the minimum
work requirements of the section in any event.
As this Court has said in State Tax Commission, supra, and
the cases cited therein and many other cases, the Utah Workers1
Compensation Act was intended to protect employees who sustain
injuries arising out of their employment.
mind, the Industrial Commission's Order

With this intent in

dismissing

Plaintiff's

claim in this case must be reversed and remanded for analysis of
the medical and damages aspects of his claim.

10

DATED this 19th day of August, 1985/

v

:NIUS DABMEY,|<:

Attoriieys for Plaintiflf

J

1 O

ADDENDUM
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Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-42(2) (1983)
[Employer Coverage Exception Defined]
The

following

shall

constitute

employers

subject

to

the

provisions of this title:
(1)

The state, and each county, city, town and school dis-

trict in the state.
(2)

Every person, firm and private corporation, including

every public utility, having in service one or more workmen or
operatives

regularly

employed

in the

same business, or

in or

about the same establishment, under any contract of hire, express
or

implied, oral or written, except agricultural employers who

meet any one of the following conditions: (a) whose employees are
all .members of the immediate family of the employer, which employer has a proprietary interest in the farm; provided that the
inclusion of any immediate family member under the provisions of
this title is at the option of the employer or (b) who employ
five or fewer persons other than immediate family members for 40
hours or more per week per each employee for 13 consecutive weeks
during any part of the preceding 12 months; and except domestic
employers who do not employ one employee or more than one employee at least 40 hours per week; provided, that employers of
agricultural laborers and domestic servants, shall have the right
to come under the terms of this title by complying with the provisions

thereof

and

the

rules

and

sion.

.1^-

regulations

of the commis-

The term "regularly" as herein used shall include all employers in the usual course of the trade, business, provision or
occupation of the employer, whether continuous through the year
or for only a portion of the year.

_1A_

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 8500019

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

ARTHUR J. BARTON,
Applicant,
vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

*
*

RIVER RANCHES
(Uninsured)

AND ORDER

*

Defendants,
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * : * * * '

HEARING:

BEFORE:
APPEARANCES:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on March 18,
1985 at 10:00 o'clock a.m.
Said hearing was pursuant
to Order and Notice of the Commission.
Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge.
The applicant was present and represented by Virginius
Dabney, Attorney at Law.
Defendant was present and represented by K. L. Mclff,
Attorney at Law.

At the Conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the defendant, by and
through counsel, made a motion to dismiss the application for hearing, for the
reason that the defendant was a agricultural employer pursuant to Section
35-1-42 (b) , Utah Code Annotated.
The motion was taken under advisement by
the Administrative Law Judge.
Being fully advised in the premises, the
Administrative Law Judge is prepared to enter the following.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
This case concerns whether or not River Ranches, is an agricultural
employer as provided in Section 35-1-42 (b), Utah Code Annotated.
River Ranches, is a limited partnership, which was formed by Lloyd
Johnson. Mr. Johnson being the father of his two general partners and sons,
Gerald Johnson and Burt Johnson.
In turn, the limited partners of River
Ranches consist of Lloyd Johnson's wife, Melva, and his five grandsons. River
Ranches, consists of the Lost Creek Farm which is a feed and sheepherding
business.
Approximately 50% of the income is derived from the growing of
cattle feed, and other of their income is derived from sheepherding.
The
applicant herein, Arthur Barton, commenced employment with River Ranches as a
sheepherder in March of 1984. At that time, there were two other sheep
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ARTHUR J. BARTON
FINDING OF FACT
PAGE TWO

herders working for River Ranches, Mark Barton, the applicant's brother, and
Cameron Connor.
In addition, Richard Boyack worked in the shed, thereby
making a total of four employees.
In reviewing the extensive records
submitted by the defendant, the Administrative Law Judge finds that on April
17, 1984 there were a total of four employees other than immediate members of
the family working for River Ranches, with the applicant being one of that
four.
The pertinent statutory provisions, in Section 35-1-42, which
provides in Subsection (2): "every person, firm and private corporation,...
except agricultural employers... (b) who employ five or fewer persons other
than immediate family members for forty hours or more per week per each
employee for 13 consecutive weeks during any part of the proceeding twelve
mon t h ^•
that the g e n e r a l p a r t n e r s and the limited partners of River Ranches are all
m e m b e r s of M r . Lloyd Johnson's immediate family.
F u r t h e r , I find that River
Ranches employed four persons other than immediate family members for the
r e l e v a n t period under c o n s i d e r a t i o n , and a c c o r d i n g l y they are an a g r i c u l t u r a l
employer as defined by Section 42 of the A c t , and as such are not required to
have w o k e r s ' c o m p e n s a t i o n insurance c o v e r a g e .
COKCLl«^ T Oo" CF LAW:
River R a n c h e s is an a g r i c u l t u r a l employer p u r s u a n t to Section
(2) (b), Utah Code Annotated.

35-1-42

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of Arthur J. Barton should be,
and the same is hereby dismissed for the reason that his employer, River
Ranches, is an agricultural employer as defined in Section 35-1-42, and as
such is not required to have workers' compensation insurance.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof
specifying in detail the particular errors ana ODjections, and uniess so filed
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
22
day of March, 1985
ATTEST:
/s/ Linda J. Strasburg
Linda J. Strasburg
Commission Secretary

CERTIFICATE OF HAILING

I certify that on March 22 , 1985 a copy of the attached
Finding of Fact Conclusion of Law and Order was mailed to the following
persons at the following addresses, postage paid:
Arthur J. Barton, 305 North 400 West, Salina, Utah

84654

irginius Dabney, Attorney, 412 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84101
K. L. Mclff, Attorney, P.O. Box 605, Richfield, Utah
River Ranches, Aurora, Utah

84620

By

Barbara
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1
VIRGINIUS DABNEY, ESQ-

2 DABNEY & DABNEY, P.C.
for Applicant
3 Attorneys
Kearns Building - Suite 412
136 South Main Street
4 Salt
Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone:
(301) 328-9000
5

6
7

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF UTAH

8

DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE AND DISABILITY

9

ARTHUR J. BARTON,

10
11
12
13

MOTION FOR REVIEW

Applicant,
-vsRIVER RANCHES [Uninsured Employer],

Case No. 8500019
Defendant,

14
15
16
17
18
19

COMES NOW Applicant, pursuant t o the Utah Rule of C i v i l Procedure and
the Rule of the I n d u s t r i a l Ccamission of Utah, inter a l i a , and moves the
Commission for an Order reversing the decision of the Administrative Law Judge
dated March 22, 1985 wherein he held that the uninsured Defendant was an
a g r i c u l t u r a l employer within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated §35-1-^2 (2)
(b) (1983) . A Manorandum in Support w i l l be filed on or before Friday, ADril
19, 1985.
DATED t h i s 4th day of April, 1985

20
21
22
23

VIR&Ht^^/DABNEY"ESO. \j
Attorneys (for Appl.icbnd

24
25

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

26

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document vvas mailed, postage pre-paid, on this the 4th day of April, 1985 to the
following;

27
28
5^ "E . 2

1

2
3
4
5

K. L. Mclff, Esq.
P. 0. Box 605
Richfield, Utah 84701
Mr. Arthur J . Barton
305 North 400 West
Salina, Utah 84654

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
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1
VIRGINIUS DABNEY, ESQ.
DABNEY & DABNEY, P.C.
Attorneys for Applicant
3
Kearns Building - Suite 412
136 South Main Street
4
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
_ Telephone: (801) 328-9000
2

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF UTAH

7
8

DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE AND DISABILITY

9 ARTHUR J. BARTON,
10

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

Applicant,

11 -vs-

OF MOTION FOR REVIEW

12 RIVER RANCHES [Uninsured Employer],
13

Case No. 8500019

Defendant.

14
15

On March 22, 1985 the Administrative Law Judge denied the claim of Arthur

16 J. Barton for the reason that his employer was exempt from the workers*
17

compensation statutory scheme as an agricultural employer pursuant to U.C.A.

18 §35-1-42 (1983). The employer was a limited partnership consisting of Floyd
19 Johnson, his wife, two sons and five grand^ess. River Ranches, a limited
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

partnership was the anployer of the Claimant.

recognized the general rule that a partnership is a separate entity. Palle v.
Industrial Carmission, Utah, 7 P.2d 284, 287-288 (1932).

the problem of the separate entity issue when partnerships are involved in
workers1

compensation claims.

However, Professor Larson notes that this

problem is "... confined to the type of case in which a partner ... is the
claimant [and] it is in such cases that the almost insuperable conceptual

28
INS BUILDING, SUITE 412
J SOUTH MAIN STREET
LAKE CITY

UTAH 84101

( 301 )

323-9000

Professor Larson in

his treatise, Workmens1 Compensation Law, §54.31 (Supp. 1984-1985), recognizes

kBNEY & DABNEY

PHONE

The Utah Supreme Court has

««,0 0 « .

1
ijobstacle is encountered of having the same person appear as employer and

9

isnployee."

Q
3

|!

Id. However, when the employer/employee merger is not involved,
~~

. I [Professor Larson points out that the courts have no d i f f i c u l t y in t r e a t i n g the
5
6

partnership as an entity to effectuate the general beneficient purpose of
workers' compensation legislation:
A fortiori, when the Claimant is simply an employee of
the partnership unrelated to any partner, courts have
uniformly held that the partnership is a separate employing entity. _Id_.

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Therefore, the general rule is that, for purpose of workers' compensation, a
[partnership is a separate employing entity.
j

And, furthermore, an entity, such as a partnership or corporation, can

j

have neither a spouse nor an "immediate family mmber11 - only a person can
;have

those

familial

relationships.

Because

River

Ranches,

a

limited

s

ipartnership, was the Employer of Claimant, it cannot as a matter of law have
any relations.

; t

1R •

Though the general and limited partners were all related to

peach other, none of them were or could be related to the Employer.
17 i'
'!
The general law recognized by most jurisdictions is that a partner cannot
|
|
18
jibe c l a s s i f i e d as an employee of his partnership for workmen's compensation
19 il
;'purposes. The conceptual obstacle which is encountered, as described above,
20 U
His that the same person assumes the role of employer and employee. Id. A
21 -i
ppartner cannot be both employer and employee of his firm. 81 Am. Jur. 2d,
22 '
^"Workmen's Compensation'1, §176 (Supp. 1984-1985).
However, there are

2 3 ji
^exceptions to this general rule.
24 ^
j!
The primary exception to the general rule involves "working partners11 who
!
25 ^
llreceive wages in addition to a share of the p r o f i t s , and their wages are
26 V
i (included in the p a y r o l l .
Wor kmens' Canpens at ion, supra at §54.30.
81 An.
: j u r . 2d, supra.
28 ' •
-23-

!!

Mi
|j
Hence, if the limited partners of River Ranches contributed their services to the partnership and received compensation for those services, then
3

!i

4 ! they, arguably were employees of the partnership. In Leventhal v. Atlantic
Rainbow Painting Co,, 172 A.2d 710, 712 (1961), the Court recognized that a
5
[statutory limited partnership is an entity separate and apart from its part6
hners. As such, the limited partnership acting through its manager, could have
7
a family member counted as an ordinary employee•
8
I
It is submitted that the Defendant, River Ranches, failed to present
9

1

10

^sufficient evidence which supports the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion

-- 'Ithat River Ranches is entitled to the agricultural employer exemption defined
-^ |!in the statute. Because River Ranches admitted that four of its employees who
-o jwere also not related to the Johnson family, worked more than the time
ii

14 • 'provided by statute, and, in addition and significantly, also admitted that
15

various Johnson family members also worked at River Ranches and received

«Q | remuneration over the applicable period of time, it is respectfully submitted
^y |;that the Employer did not satisfy its burden of proof in establishing that it
ii

ig j|did not
ig : statute.

employ 6 or
The

fewer people for the minimim periods provided by

testimony

given by

Mr. Johnson

at

the hearing

clearly

20 i established the possibility of six or more workers as having worked during the
2i ^applicable period and for the periods of time provided for in the statute, all
22 of which renders River Ranches an Employer within the meaning of the Workers'
23 ;Compensation Statutes.
24 ;j

It is also significant to note that River Ranches failed to introduce any

25 ^testimony or documentary evidence in its case in chief to support its position
25 ithat the exemption to the statute applied to River Ranches. Exemptions to
27 ;tnandatory statutory coverage are always strictly construed against those
28 claiming

the

exemption,

because

-24-

of

the

remedial

nature

of

workers'

1 !!
compensation l e g i s l a t i o n .
!of proof of establishing

As a r e s u l t , River Ranches c l e a r l y bore the burden
the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the exemption to i t

c a s e , and because of the open-ended nature of Mr. Johnson's testimony,

in

this
failed

jlto sustain that burden.
5 I

6 I

Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of C i v i l Procedure requires that a party set

ii|jforth

any affirmative defenses when responding to a preceding pleading. The
ii
' ilparty raising an affirmative defense bear the burden of proof. Wagstaff v.
7

o ii

franco, Inc., Utah, 540 P.2d 931, 934 (1975).

9

!

10

River Ranches failed to present sufficient evidence at the hearing to

.... i'support its position that it was entitled to the exemption of Section 42.
i

10

ii

12 |j

CONCLUSION
The uncont rover ted facts are that River Ranches is a limited partnership,

11
! ;
14 !;and

that

it was the employer of Claimant

at the time he sustained his

i!

1

j- !-industrial injury.

As a limited partnership, it cannot have a spouse nor

|j

^ g jiimmediate fanily member and therefore cannot be identified as an agricultural
1 y | [employer within the meaning of the Workers1 Compensation exemption set forth
ig j;in Section 42. And finally, it is also submitted that River Ranches failed to
ig imeets its burden of proof in that regard as w^
20 j

DATED t h i s 24th day of April, 1985

21 J!
22 i;
23 i!
VIRGINHUS BASNET, ESQ.
Attorneys for Applicant

24 n

25 ji
26 n
27 !i

CERTIFICATE OF MAILlfC
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing docunent

23 was mailed, postage pre-paid, on this the 24th day of April, 1985 to the

-25-

1
following:

2

ii

3 i
II
4ii

6|j
6 |

K. L. Mclff, Esq.
P. 0. Box 605
Richfield, Utah 84701
Mr. Arthur J . Barton
305 North 400 West
Salina, Utah 84654

si!
9j|
io|;
Attorneys for Applicant

1 1 !:

!

i i
i |

12 |l
1 3 |j

I!
14 j |

15 P
16 j |

17 j !
18J!
19jj
20 jj
21 ||
22 ;!
23;;
24 jj
25;!

26 jj
27; |
'I
28 :j
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 8500019

*

ARTHUR J. BARTON,

*
*

Applicant,

*

DENIAL OF

*

vs.

*

MOTION FOR REVIEW

*

RIVER RANCHES,
(UNINSURED)
Defendants.

*
*
*
*

On or about March 22, 1985, an Order was entered by an Administrative
Law Judge of the Commission wherein benefits were denied in the above entitled
case.
On or about April 4, 1985, the Commission received a Motion for
Review from the Applicant by and through his attorney.
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire
review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Annotated.
has reviewed the file in the above entitled case and we are
that the Motion for Review should be denied and the Order of
tive Law Judge affirmed. In affirming, the Commission adopts
Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Administrative Law Judge.

Commission for
The Commission
of the opinion
the Administrathe Findings of

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of the Administrative Law
Judge dated March 22, 1985, shall be, and the same is hereby, affirmed and the
Motion for Review shall be, and the same is hereby, denied.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on April_
Denial of Motion for Review was mailed
following addresses, postage paid:

_, 1985, a copy of the attached
to the following persons at the

Arthur J. Barton, 305 North 400 West, Salina, UT

84654

Virginius Dabney, Atty., 412 Kearns, Bldg., SLC, UT 84101
K. L. Mclff, Atty., P. 0. Box 605, richfield, UT 84701
River Ranches, Aurora, UT 84620

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

By

-28-

Wilma

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
dociment, postage prepaid, on this the 19th day of August, 1985, to the following :

David L. Wilkinson, Esq.
Attorney General of the State of Utah
Office of the Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
K. L. Mciff, Esq.
JACKSON, MclFF, & MOWER
Post Office Box 605
151 North Main Street
Richfield, Utah 84701
Telephone: (801) 896-5441

, „_r,.r« DABNEY1, "E!=
AttdtneVs for Plkint'iff
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